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The past decade and future of AI’s Impact on Society1
Joanna J. Bryson
University of Bath, Department of Computer Science
Abstract
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a technical term referring to artefacts used to
detect contexts or to effect actions in response to detected contexts. Our
capacity to build such artefacts has been increasing, and with it the im-
pact they have on our society. This chapter first documents the social and
economic changes brought about by our use of AI, particularly but not ex-
clusively focussing on the decade since the 2007 advent of smart phones,
which contribute substantially to ‘big data’ and therefore the efficacy of ma-
chine learning. It then projects from this political, economic, and personal
challenges confronting humanity in the near future, including policy recom-
mendations. Overall, AI is not as unusual a technology as expected, but
this very lack of expected form may have exposed us to a significantly in-
creased urgency concerning familiar challenges. In particular, the identity
and autonomy of both individuals and nations is challenged by the increased
accessibility of knowledge.
1. Introduction
The past decade, and particularly the past few years, have been transfor-
mative for artificial intelligence (AI) not so much in terms of what we can
do with this technology as what we are doing with it. Some place the advent
of this era to 2007, with the introduction of smart phones. As I detail be-
low, at its most essential, intelligence is just intelligence, whether artefact or
1An older version of some of this material was delivered to the OECD (Karine Perset)
in May 2017 under the title “Current and Potential Impacts of Artificial Intelligence and
Autonomous Systems on Society”, and contributes to their efforts and documents of late
2018 and early 2019.
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animal. It is a form of computation, and as such a transformation of infor-
mation. The cornucopia of deeply personal information that resulted from
the wilful tethering of a huge portion of society to the Internet has allowed
us to pass immense explicit and implicit knowledge from human culture via
human brains into digital form. Here we can not only use it to operate with
humanlike competence, but also produce further knowledge and behaviour
by means of machine-based computation.
For decades—even prior to the inception of the term—AI has aroused
both fear and excitement as humanity contemplates creating machines in
our image. This expectation that intelligent artefacts should by necessity
be humanlike artefacts blinded most of us to the important fact that we
have been achieving AI for some time. While the breakthroughs in surpass-
ing human ability at human pursuits such as chess (Hsu, 2002), go (Silver
et al., 2016), and translation (Wu et al., 2016) make headlines, AI has been
a standard part of the industrial repertoire since at least the 1980s. Then
production-rule or ‘expert’ systems became a standard technology for check-
ing circuit boards and detecting credit card fraud (Liao, 2005). Similarly,
machine learning (ML) strategies like genetic algorithms have long been used
for intractable computational problems like scheduling, and neural networks
not only to model and understand human learning, but also for basic indus-
trial control and monitoring (Widrow et al., 1994). In the 1990s probabilistic
and Bayesian methods revolutionised ML and opened the door to some of
the most pervasive AI technologies now available: search through massive
troves of data (Bishop, 1995). This search capacity included the ability to
do semantic analysis of raw text, astonishingly enabling Web users to find
the documents they seek out of trillions of Web pages just by typing just a
few words (Lowe, 2001; Bullinaria and Levy, 2007).
This capacity to use AI for discovery has been extended not only by the
massive increase of digital data and available computing power, but also by
innovations in AI and ML algorithms. We are now searching photographs,
videos, and audio (Barrett et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2016). We can trans-
late, transcribe, read lips, read emotions (including lying), forge signatures
and other handwriting, and forge video (Assael et al., 2016; Eyben et al.,
2013; Deng et al., 2017; Haines et al., 2016; Reed et al., 2016; Vincent, 2016;
Hancock et al., 2007; Chung and Zisserman, 2017; Schuller et al., 2016; Sar-
tori et al., 2016; Thies et al., 2016). Critically, we can forge real-time au-
dio/video during live transmissions, allowing us to choose the words millions
‘witness’, particularly for celebrities such as politicians for whom there is
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already a great deal of data for composing accurate models (Thies et al.,
2016; Suwajanakorn et al., 2017). At the time of this writing, there is in-
creasing evidence that the outcomes of the 2016 US presidential election and
UK referendum on EU membership were both altered by the AI detection
and targeting of ‘swing voters’ via their public social media use (Cadwalladr,
2017a,b; ICO, 2018), not to mention the AI-augmented tools used in cyber-
hacking (Brundage et al., 2018). AI is here now, available to and benefiting
us all. But its consequences for our social order are not only not understood,
but have until recently barely even yet the subject of study (Bryson, 2015).
Yet now too, with advances in robotics, AI is entering our physical spaces in
the form of autonomous vehicles, weapons, drones, and domestic devices, in-
cluding ‘smart speakers’ (really, microphones) and even games consoles (Jia
et al., 2016). We are becoming surrounded by—even embedded in—pervasive
automated perception, analysis, and increasingly action.
What have been and will be the impacts of pervasive synthetic intelli-
gence? How can society regulate the way technology alters our lives? In
this article, I begin by presenting a clean, clear set of definitions for the rel-
evant terminology. I then review concerns and suggested remediations with
respect to technology. Finally, I make expert though unproven recommen-
dations concerning the value of individual human lives, as individual human
capacities come increasingly under threat of redundancy to automation.
2. Definitions
The following definitions are not universally used, but derive from a well
established AI text Winston (1984), as well as from the study of biological
intelligence (Barrows 2000, attributed to Romanes 1883). They are selected
for clarity of communication at least local to this chapter, about the existing
and potential impacts of intelligence, particularly in machines. Intelligence
is the capacity to do the right thing at the right time, in a context where
doing nothing (making no change in behaviour) would be worse. Intelligence
then requires:
• the capacity to perceive contexts for action,
• the capacity to act, and
• the capacity to associate contexts to actions.
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By this definition, plants are intelligent (Trewavas, 2005). So is a thermo-
stat (McCarthy, 1983; Touretzky, 1988). They can perceive and respond to
context e.g. plants to the direction of light, thermostats to temperature. We
further discriminate a system as being cognitive if it is able to modify its
intelligence, something plants and at least mechanical thermostats cannot
do. Cognitive systems are able to learn new contexts, actions, and/or asso-
ciations between these. This comes closer to the conventional definition of
‘intelligent’.
Intelligence as I defined it here is a strict subset of computation, the
transformation of information. Note that computation is a physical process,
it is not math. It takes time, space, and energy. Intelligence is the subset of
computation that transforms a context into action.
Artificial intelligence (AI), by convention, is a term used to describe (typ-
ically digital) artefacts that extend any of the capacities related to natural
intelligence. So for example, machine vision, speech recognition, pattern
recognition, and fixed (unlearning) production systems are all considered ex-
amples of AI, with algorithms that can be found in standard AI textbooks
(Russell and Norvig, 2009). These can also all be seen as forms of computa-
tion, even if their outputs aren’t conventionally seen as action. If we embrace
though the lessons of embodied robotics (see below) then we might extend
this definition to include as AI any artefact that extends our own capacities
to perceive and act. Although this would be an unusual definition, it might
also give us a firmer grip on the sorts of changes AI brings to our society, by
allowing us to examine a longer history of technological interventions.
Machine learning (ML) is any means of programming AI that requires
not only conventional hand coding, but also a component of automated gen-
eralisation over presented data by means of accumulating statistics on that
data (Murphy, 2012; Erickson et al., 2017). Often but not necessarily ML
comes down to seeking regularities in data that are associated with categories
of interest, including appropriate opportunities for particular actions. ML
is also often used to capture associations, and can be used to acquire new
action skills, for example from demonstration (Huang et al., 2016).
Note that all ML still involves a hand-programmed component. The
mere conceptualisation or discovery of an algorithm never leads to a machine
capable of sensing or acting springing spontaneously into existence. All AI
is by definition an artefact, brought into being by deliberate human acts.
Something must be built and designed to connect some data source to some
representation before any learning can occur. All intelligent systems have
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an architecture, a layout through which energy and information flows, and
nearly always including locations where some information is retained, termed
memory. The design of this architecture is called systems engineering, it is at
this point that a systems safety and validity should be established. Contrary
to some outrageous but distressingly frequent claims, AI safety is not a new
field. Systems engineering in fact predates computers (Schlager, 1956), and
has always been a principle component of computer science education. AI
has long been integrated into software, as documented in the introduction,
so there is a long history of it being engineered so in safe ways (e.g. Bryson,
2003; Chessell and Smith, 2013).
Robots are artefacts that sense and act in the physical world, and in real
time. By this definition a smart phone is a (domestic) robot. It has not only
microphones but also a variety of proprioceptive sensors that allow it to know
when its orientation is changing or it is falling. Its range of actions includes
intervening with its user and transmitting information including instructions
to other devices. The same is true of may some game consoles and digital
home assistants—‘smart spakers’/microphones like Google Home, Amazon’s
Echo (Alexa), or Microsoft’s Cortina.
Autonomy is technically the capacity to act as an individual (Armstrong
and Read, 1995; Cooke, 1999). So for example a country loses its autonomy
if either its institutions collapse such that only its citizens’ individual actions
have of efficacy, or if its institutions come under the influence of other agen-
cies or governments to such an extent that again its own government has no
impact on its course of actions. Of course, either extreme is very unusual.
In fact, for social animals like humans autonomy is never absolute (Gilbert
et al., 2012). Our individual intelligence determines many of our actions, but
some cells may become cancerous in pursuit of their own goals contra our
overall well being (Hanahan and Weinberg, 2011). Similarly, we fully expect
a family, place of work, or government, to have impact on our actions. We
also experience far more social influence implicitly than we are ever aware
of (Devos and Banaji, 2003). Nevertheless, we are viewed as autonomous,
because there is an extent to which our own individual intelligence also influ-
ences our behaviour. A technical system able to sense the world and select
an action specific to its present context is therefore called ‘autonomous’ even
though its actions will ultimately be determined by some combination of the
designers that constructed its intelligence and its operators. Operators may
influence AI in real time, and will necessarily influence it in advance by set-
ting parameters of its operation, including when and where it operates, if at
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all. As discussed earlier, designers call the system into existence and deter-
mine its capacities, particularly what information it has access to and what
actions it can take. Even if a designer chooses to introduce an element of
chance such as dependence on the present environment or a random-number
generator into the control of an AI system, that inclusion is still the deliberate
choice of the designer.
3. Concerns about AI and Society
AI is core to some of the most successful companies in history in terms
of market capitalisation — Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft and Amazon. Along
with Information and Communication Technology (ICT) more generally, AI
has revolutionised the ease with which people from all over the world can
access knowledge, credit, and other benefits of contemporary global society.
Such access has helped lead to massive reduction of global inequality and
extreme poverty, for example by allowing farmers to know fair prices, best
crops, and giving them access to accurate weather predictions (Aker and
Mbiti, 2010).
AI is the beneficiary of decades of regulatory policy: research and deploy-
ment has so far been largely up-regulated with massive government and other
capital investment (Brundage and Bryson, 2017; Miguel and Casado, 2016;
Technology Council Committee on Technology, 2016). Although much of the
emphasis of later parts of this chapter focusses on possible motivations for
or mechanisms of regulatory restriction on AI, it should be recognised that:
1. Any such AI policies should and basically will always be developed and
implemented in the light of the importance of respecting the positive
impacts of technology as well2.
2. No one is talking about introducing regulation to AI. AI already ex-
ists in a regulatory framework (Brundage and Bryson, 2017; O’Reilly,
2017), what we are discussing is whether that framework needs opti-
mising.
2See further for upside analysis the Obama administration’s late AI policy documents
(Technology Council Committee on Technology, 2016; of the President, 2016). For reasons
of space and focus I also do not discuss here the special case of military use of AI. That is
already the subject of other significant academic work, and is generally regulated through
different mechanisms than commercial and domestic AI. See though Brundage et al. (2018);
ICRC (2018)
6
3. Regulation has so far mostly been entirely constructive, with govern-
ments providing vast resources to companies and universities develop-
ing AI. Even where regulation constrains, informed and well-designed
constraint can lead to more sustainable and even faster growth.
Having said this academics, technologists, and the general public have raised
a number of concerns that may indicate a need for down-regulation or con-
straint. Smith (2018), president of Microsoft, recently asserted:
[Intelligent3] technology raises issues that go to the heart of fun-
damental human rights protections like privacy and freedom of
expression. These issues heighten responsibility for tech com-
panies that create these products. In our view, they also call
for thoughtful government regulation and for the development of
norms around acceptable uses. In a democratic republic, there is
no substitute for decision making by our elected representatives
regarding the issues that require the balancing of public safety
with the essence of our democratic freedoms.
In this section I categorise perceived risks by the sort of policy require-
ments they are likely to generate. I also make recommendations about
whether these are non-problems, problems of ICT or technology more gen-
erally, or problems special to AI, and in each case what the remedy may
be.
3.1. Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and Superintelligence
I start with some of the most sensational claims — that as artificial
intelligence increases to the point that it surpasses human abilities, it may
come to take control over our resources and outcompete our species, leading
to human extinction. As mentioned in Sec 1, AI is already superhuman
in many domains. We can already do arithmetic better, play chess and
go better, transcribe speech better, read lips better, remember more things
for longer, and indeed be faster and stronger with machines than unaided.
While these capacities have disrupted human lives including employment (see
below), they have in no way lead to machine ambition.
Some claim that the lack of machine ambition or indeed domination is
because the forms of AI generated so far are not sufficiently general. The
3Here, facial recognition.
7
term artificial general intelligence (AGI) is used to describe two things: AI
capable of learning anything without limits, and human-like AI. These two
meanings of AGI are generally conflated, but such conflation is incoherent,
since in fact human intelligence has significant limitations. Understanding
the limitations of human intelligence is informative because they relate also
to the limits of AI.
Limitations on human intelligence derive from two causes: combinatorics
and bias. The first, combinatorics, is a universal problem affecting all com-
putation and therefore all natural and artificial intelligence. : combinatorics
(Sipser, 2005). If an agent is capable of 100 actions, then it is capable of
10,000 2-step plans. Since humans are capable of far more than 100 different
actions and perform far more than two actions even in a day, we can see that
the space of possible strategies is inconceivably vast, and cannot be easily
conquered by any scale of intelligence (Wolpert, 1996b).
However, computer science has demonstrated that some ways to exploring
such vast spaces are more effective than others, at least for specific purposes
(Wolpert, 1996a). Most relevantly to intelligence, concurrent search by many
processors simultaneously can be effective provided that the problem space
can be split between them, and that a solution once found can be both recog-
nised and communicated (Grama, 2003). The reason human technology is
so much more advanced than other species’ is because we are far more ef-
fective at this strategy of concurrent search, due to our unique capacity to
share advances or ‘good tricks’ via language (Dennett, 2013; Bryson, 2008,
2015; van Schaik et al., 2017). Our culture’s increasing pace of change is
in part due in part to the unprecedented number of individuals with good
health and education connected together by ICT, but also to our augmen-
tation of our search via machine computing. Our increasing capacities for
AI and artifactual computation more generally increase further our potential
rate of exploration; quantum computation could potentially accelerate these
far further (Williams, 2010). However, note that these advantages do not
come for free. Doing two computations at once may double the speed of
the computation if the task was perfectly divisible, but it certainly doubles
the amount of space and energy needed to do the computation. Quantum
computing is concurrent in space as well as time, but its energy costs are so
far unknown, and very likely to be exorbitant.
Much of the recent immense growth of AI has been largely due to im-
proved capacities to ‘mine’ using ML the existing discoveries of humanity and
nature more generally (Caliskan et al., 2017; Moeslund and Granum, 2001;
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Calinon et al., 2010). The outcomes of some of our previous computation
are stored in our culture, and biological evolution can also be though of as
a massive parallel search, where the outcomes are collated very inefficiently,
only as fast as the best genes manage to reproduce themselves. We can ex-
pect this strategy of mining past solutions to soon plateau, when artificial
and human intelligence come to be sharing the same, though still-expanding
boundary of extant knowledge.
The second source of limitations on human intelligence, which I called
‘bias’ above, are those special to our species. Given the problems of com-
binatorics, all species only explore a tiny subset of possible solutions, and
in ML such focus is called bias. The exact nature of any biological intel-
ligence is part of its evolutionary niche, and is unlikely to be shared even
by other biological species except to the extent that they have similar sur-
vival requirements and strategies (Laland et al., 2000). Thus we share many
of our cognitive attributes—including perception and action capacities, and
importantly, motivations—with other apes. Yet we also have specialist mo-
tivations and capacities reflecting our highly social nature (Stoddart, 1990).
No amount of intelligence in itself necessitates social competitiveness, neither
does it demand the desire to be accepted by an ingroup, to dominate an out-
group, nor to achieve recognition within an ingroup. These are motivations
that underlie human cooperation and competition that result from our evo-
lutionary history (Mace, 1998; Lamba and Mace, 2012; Jordan et al., 2016;
Bryson et al., 2017); further, they vary even among humans (Herrmann et al.,
2008; Van Lange et al., 1997; Sylwester et al., 2017). For humans, social or-
ganisations easily varied to suit a politico-economic context are a significant
survival mechanism (Stewart et al., 2018).
None of this is necessary—and much of it is even incoherent—from the
perspective of an artefact. Artefacts are definitionally designed by human
intent, not directly by evolution. With these intentional acts of authored hu-
man creation4 comes not only human responsibility, but an entirely different
landscape of potential rewards and design constraints (Bryson et al., 2017;
Bryson, 2018).
Given all of the above, AGI is obviously a myth — in fact, two orthogonal
4The choice to create life through childbirth is not the same. While we may author
some of childrearing, the dispositions just discussed are shared with other primates, and
are not options left to parents to authors.
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myths.
1. No amount of natural or artificial intelligence will be able to solve all
problems, and
2. even extremely powerful AI is exceedingly unlikely to be very human-
like, because it will embody an entirely different set of motivations and
reward functions.
These assertions however do not protect us from another, related concern.
Superintelligence is a term used to describe the situation when a cognitive
system not only learns, but learns how to learn. Here again there are two
component issues. First, at this point an intelligence should be able to rapidly
snowball to such an extent that it would be incomprehensible to ordinary
human examination. Second, even if the intelligence was carefully designed to
have goals aligned with human needs, it might develop for itself unanticipated
subgoals that are not. For example, a chess-playing robot might learn to
shoot the people that deprive it of sufficient resources to improve its game
play by switching it off at night, or a filing robot might turn the planet into
paperclips in order to ensure all potential papers can be adequately ordered
(Bostrom, 2012).
These two examples are ludicrous if we remember that all AI systems
are designed and a matter of human responsibility. No one has ever made a
chess program that represents information concerning any resources not on
the chessboard (with the possible exception of time), nor with the capacity to
fire a gun. The choice of capacities and components of a computer system is
again part of its architecture; As I mentioned earlier, the systems engineering
of architecture is an important component to extant AI safety, and as I will
say below (Sec 4.3), it can also be an important means for regulating AI.
However, the concept of superintelligence itself is not ludicrous; it is clear
that systems that learn to learn can and do experience exponential growth.
The mistake made by futurists concerned with superintelligence is to think
that this situation is only a possible future. In fact, it is an excellent de-
scription of human culture over the last 10,000 years, since the innovation
of writing (Barnosky, 2008; Haberl et al., 2007). The augmentation of hu-
man intelligence with technology has indeed resulted in a system that has
not been carefully designed and results in unintended consequences. Some of
these consequences are very hazardous, such as global warming and the re-
duction of species diversity.List and Pettit (2011) make a similar point when
they call human organisations such as corporations or governments ‘AI’.
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As I mentioned I will return to the importance of architecture and design
again, but it is worth emphasising again here the necessity of such biases and
limits. Robots make it particularly apparent that behaviour depends not
only on computational capacities but also on other system attributes such as
physical capacities. Digital manipulation such as typing or playing the flute
is just not an option for either a smart phone or a snake, however intelligent.
Motivations are similar. Unless we design a system to have anthropomorphic
goals, social perception, and social behaviour capacities, we are not going to
see it learning to produce anthropomorphic social behaviour like seeking to
dominate conversations, corporations, or countries. If corporations do show
these characteristics, it is because of the expression of the human components
of their organisation, and also because of the undisciplined, evolutionary
means by which they accrete size and power. From this example we can
see that it is possible for an AI system—at the very least by the List and
Pettit (2011) argument, to express superintelligence, which implies that such
intelligent systems should be regulated to avoid this.
From the above I conclude that the problem of superintelligence is real
but not special to AI; it is rather one our cultures already face. AI is however
now a contributing factor to our capacity to excel, but this may also lead us
to learn to better self regulate—that is, govern—as it has several times in the
past (Milanovic, 2016; Scheidel, 2017). Even were AGI to be true and the
biological metaphor of AI competing by natural selection to be sound, there
is no real reason to believe that we would be extinguished by AI. We have
not extinguished the many species (particularly of microbial) on which we
ourselves directly depend. Considering unintended consequences of the expo-
nentially increasing intelligence of our entire socio-technical system (rather
than AI on its own) does however lead us to more substantial concerns.
3.2. Inequality and employment
For centuries there have been significant concerns about the displace-
ment of workers by technology (Autor, 2015). There is no question that new
technologies do disrupt communities, families, and lives, but also that histor-
ically the majority of this disruption has been for the better (Pinker, 2012).
In general lifespans are longer and infant mortality lower than ever before,
and these indicators are good measures of contentedness in humans, as low
infant mortality in particular is well associated with political stability (King
and Zeng, 2001).
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However some disruption does lead to political upheaval, and has been re-
cently hypothesised to associate with the rise of AI. Income (and presumably
wealth) inequality is highly correlated with political polarisation (McCarty
et al., 2016). Political polarisation is defined by the inability of political par-
ties to cooperate in democratic governance, but periods of polarisation are
also characterised by increases in identity politics and political extremism.
Political polarisation and income inequality covary but either can lead the
other; the causal factors underlying the relationship are not well understood
(Stewart et al., 2018). What is known is that the last time these measures
were as high as they are now (at least in the OECD) was immediately before
and after the First World War. Unfortunately, it took decades of policy inno-
vation, a global financial crisis, and a second world war before inequality and
polarisation were radically reduced and stabilised in the period 1945–1978
(Scheidel, 2017), though note that in some countries such as the USA and
UK the second shock of the financial crisis was enough.
Fortunately, we now know how to redress this situation—redistribution
lowers inequality. After the Second World War, when tax rates were around
50%, modern welfare states were built or finalised, transnational wealth ex-
traction was blocked (Bullough, 2018), and both income inequality and po-
litical polarisation were kept low for over 20 years. During this time, wages
also kept pace with productivity (Mishel, 2012). However, some time around
1978 wages plateaued, and both inequality and political polarisation began
rising, again in the OECD5. The question is what caused this to happen.
There are many theories, but given the starkness of the shift on many met-
rics it looks more like a change in policy than of technology. This could reflect
geopolitical changes of the time — it could signal for example the point at
which economically-influential members of the OECD detected the coming
end of the Cold War, and shifted away from policies designed to combat the
threat of Communist uprisings.
Regardless of the causes, with respect to AI, the fact that similar political
and economic trends occurred in the late 1800s again means that this is not
a special concern of any one technology. While as mentioned there is so
5Importantly, globally, inequality is falling, due to ICT and possibly other progress such
as the effective altruism movement and data-lead philanthropy in the developing world.
See earlier discussion (p. 6 and Milanovic (2016); Bhorat et al. (2016); Singer (2015);
Gabriel (2017).
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far no consensus on causes, in ongoing research I with other authors6 are
exploring the idea that some technologies reduce costs that had traditionally
maintained diversity in the economic system. For example, when transport
costs are high, one may choose to use a nearby provider rather than finding
the global best provider for a particular good. Similarly, lack of information
transparency or scaling capacity may result in a more diverse use of providers.
Technical innovations (including in business process) may overcome these
costs and allow relatively few companies to dominate. Examples from the
late 19thC might include the use of oil, rail, and telegraph; the improvement
of shipping and newspaper delivery.
Where a few providers receive all the business, they will also receive all of
the wealth. Governance is a primary mechanism of redistribution (Landau,
2016), thus revolutions in technology may require subsequent revolutions
in governance in order to reclaim equilibrium (Stewart et al., 2018). The
welfare state could be one such example (Scheidel, 2017). We will return to
discussing the possible need for innovations in governance below (Sec 4).
To return to AI or more likely ICT, even if these technologies are not
unique in contributing to inequality and political polarisation, they may well
be the principle component technologies presently doing so. Further, the
public and policy attention currently directed towards AI may afford oppor-
tunities to both study and address the core causes of inequality and polari-
sation, particularly if AI is seen as a crisis (Tepperman, 2016). Nevertheless,
it is worth visiting one hypothesised consequence of polarisation in particu-
lar. An increase in identity politics may lead to the increased use of beliefs
to signal ingroup status or affiliation (Iyengar et al., 2012; Newman et al.,
2014), which would unfortunately decrease their proportional use to predict
or describe the world — that is, to reflect facts. Thus ironically the age of
information may not universally be the age of knowledge, but rather also an
age of disinformation7.
This reliance on beliefs as ingroup indicator may influence another wor-
rying trait about contemporary politics: loss of faith in experts. While occa-
sionally motivated by the irresponsible use or even abuse of position by some
6particularly Nolan McCarty
7I personally suspect that some of the advanced political risk taking e.g. in election
manipulation may be a result of those who fear the information age because of its con-
sequences in terms of catching illegal financial conduct such as money laundering and
fraud.
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experts, in general losing access to experts’ views is a disaster. The com-
binatorial explosion of knowledge mentioned in Sec 3.1 also means that no
one, however intelligent, can master in their lifetime all human knowledge. If
society ignores the stores of expertise it has built up—often through taxpayer
funding of higher education—it sets itself at a considerable disadvantage.
These concerns about the nature and causes of “truthiness” in what
should be the information age lead also to our next set of concerns, about
the use of personal information.
3.3. Privacy, personal liberty, and autonomy
When we consider the impact of AI on individual behaviour, we now come
to a place where ICT more clearly has a unique impact. There have long been
periods of domestic spying which have been associated with everything from
prejudiced skew in opportunities to pogroms. However, ICT is now allowing
us to keep long-term records on anyone who produces storable data — for
example, anyone with bills, contracts, digital devices, or a credit history, not
to mention any public writing and social media use. That is, essentially,
everyone.
It is not only the storage and accessibility of digital records that changes
our society; it is the fact that these can be searched using algorithms for
pattern recognition. We have lost the default assumption of anonymity by
obscurity (Selinger and Hartzog, 2017). We are to some extent all celebrities
now: any one of us can be identified by strangers, whether by facial recog-
nition software or data mining of shopping or social-media habits (Pasquale,
2015). These may indicate not just our identity but our political or eco-
nomic predispositions, and what strategies might be effective for changing
these (Cadwalladr, 2017a,b). ML allows us to discover new patterns and
regularities of which we may have had no previous conception. For example
that word choice or even handwriting pressure on a digital stylus can indi-
cate emotional state, including whether someone is lying (Bandyopadhyay
and Hazra, 2017; Hancock et al., 2007), or a pattern of social media use
predict personality categories, political preferences, and even life outcomes
(Youyou et al., 2015).
Machine learning has enabled near-human and even super-human abil-
ities in transcribing speech from voice, recognising emotions from audio or
video recordings, as well as in forging handwriting or video (Valstar and Pan-
tic, 2012; Griffin et al., 2013; Eyben et al., 2013; Kleinsmith and Bianchi-
Berthouze, 2013; Hofmann et al., 2014; Haines et al., 2016; Reed et al., 2016;
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Vincent, 2016; Thies et al., 2016; Deng et al., 2017). The better a model
we have of what people are likely to do, the less information we need to
predict what an individual will do next (Bishop, 2006; Youyou et al., 2015).
This principle allows forgery by taking a model of a person’s writing or voice,
combining it with a stream of text, and producing a ‘prediction’ or transcript
of how that person would likely write or say that text (Haines et al., 2016;
Reed et al., 2016). The same principle might allow political strategists to
identify which voters are likely to be persuaded if not to change party affilia-
tion, at least to increase or decrease their probability of turning out to vote,
and then to apply resources to persuade them to do so. Such a strategy has
been alleged have impacted significant recent elections in the UK and USA
(Cadwalladr, 2017a,b; ICO, 2018); if so they were almost certainly tested
and deployed earlier in other elections less carefully watched.
Individuals in our society might then reasonably fear the dissemination
of their actions or beliefs for two reasons: first because it makes them easier
to predict and therefore manipulate, and second because it exposes them to
persecution by those who do not approve of their beliefs. Such persecution
could range from bullying by individuals, through to missed career or other
organisational opportunities, and on to in some unstable (or at least uneth-
ical) societies, imprisonment or even death at the hands of the state. The
problem with such fears is not only that the stress of bearing them is itself
noxious, but also that in inhibiting personal liberty and free expression we
reduce the number of ideas disseminated to society as a whole, and therefore
limit our ability to innovate (Mill, 1859; Price, 1972). Responding to both
opportunities and challenges requires creativity and free thinking at every
level of society.
3.4. Corporate autonomy, revenue, and liability
These considerations of personal autonomy lead directly to the final set of
concerns I describe here, which is not one frequently mentioned. Theoretical
biology tells us that where there is greater communication, there is a higher
probability of cooperation (Roughgarden et al., 2006). While cooperation is
often wonderful, it can also be thought of as essentially moving some portion
of autonomy from the individual to a group (Bryson, 2015). Recall from the
Sec 2 definitions that the extent of autonomy an entity has is the extent to
which it determines its own actions. Individual and group autonomy must
to some extent trade off, though there are means of organising groups that
offer more or less liberty for their constituent parts. Thus the limits on
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personal liberty just described may be a very natural outcome of introducing
greater capacity for communication. Here again, I again refer to all of ICT,
but AI and ML with their capacity to accelerate search for both solutions
and collaborators are surely a significant component, and possibly game-
changing.
One irony here is that many people think that bigger data is necessarily
better, but better for what? Basic statistics teaches us that the number
of data points we need to make a prediction is limited by the amount of
variation in that data, providing only that the data is a true random sample
of its population8. The extent of data we need for science or medicine may
require only a minuscule fraction of a population. However, if we want to
spot specific individuals to be controlled, dissuaded, or even promoted, then
of course we want to “know all the things.”
But changing the costs and benefits of investment at the group level have
more consequences than only privacy and liberty. ICT facilitates blurring
the distinction between customer and corporation, or even the definition
of an economic transaction. This has so far largely unrecognised though see
Perzanowski and Schultz (2016); Frischmann and Selinger (2016). Customers
now do real labour for the corporations to whom they give their custom:
pricing and bagging groceries, punching data at ATMs for banks, filling in
forms for airlines and so forth (Bryson, 2015). The value of this labour is
not directly remunerated—we assume that we receive cheaper products in
return, and as such our loss of agency to these corporations might be seen
as a form of bartering. They are also not denominated, obscuring the value
of this economy. Thus ICT facilitates a black or at least opaque market that
reduces measured income and therefore tax revenue where taxation is based
on denominated turnover or income. This problem holds for everyone using
Internet services and interfaces, even ignoring the problematic definitions of
employment raised by platforms (though see O’Reilly, 2017). Our improving
capacity to derive value and power while avoiding revenue may also help
explain the mystery of our supposed static productivity (Brynjolfsson et al.,
2017).
This dynamic is most stark in the case of “free” Web services. Clearly we
8This caveat is very important. Much data derived from e.g. governments or commerce
may well have strong biases over who is represented or even how well that data is tran-
scribed. Such problems can substantially increase the amount of data required for a given
accuracy of prediction (Meng, 2018).
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are receiving information and/or entertainment in exchange for data and/or
attention. If we attend to content co-presented with advertisements, we
afford the presenters an opportunity to influence our behaviour. The same
is true for less conventional forms of nudging, for example the postulated
political interventions mentioned in Sec. 3.3. However, these exchanges are
only denominated (if at all) in aggregate, and only when the the corporation
providing such service is valuated. Much of the data is even collected on
speculation, it may be of no or little value until an innovative use is conceived
years later.
Our increasing failure to be able to denominate revenue at the traditional
point—income, or exchange—may be another cause for increasing wealth in-
equality, as less of the economy is recognised, taxed, and redistributed. An
obvious solution would be to tax wealth directly—for example, the market
value of a corporation—rather than income. The information age may make
it easier to track the distribution of wealth, making this strategy more viable
than it has been in the past, particularly relative to the challenges of tracking
income, if the latter challenges are indeed increasing as I described. How-
ever, it is inadequate if that wealth is then taxed only in the country (often
a tax haven) in which the corporation is formally incorporated. Given that
we can see the transnational transfer of data and engagement with services,
we should in theory be able to disseminate redistribution in proportion to
the extent and value of data derived. Enforcing such a system transnation-
ally would require substantial innovations, since ordinarily taxation is run
by government, and there is almost definitionally no transnational govern-
ment. There are however international treaties and organised economic areas.
Large countries or coordinated economies such as the European Economic
Area may be able to demand equitable redistribution for their citizens in
exchange for the privilege of access to those citizens. China has successfully
demonstrated that such access is not necessarily a given, and indeed blocking
access can facilitiate the development of local competition. Similar strategies
are being used by American cities and states against platforms such as Uber
and AirBnB.
Taxation of ICT wealth leads me to a proposed distortion of law that is
particularly dangerous. In 2016 the European Parliament proposed that AI
or robotics might be reasonably taxed as ‘e-persons’. This is a terrible idea
(Bryson et al., 2017). It would allow corporations to automate part of their
business process, then break off that piece in such a way as to limit their
liabilities for both taxes and legal damages.
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The idea of taxing robots has populist appeal for two reasons. First, it
seems basic common sense that if robots are “taking our jobs” they should
also “pay taxes” and thus support “us” via the welfare state. Second, many
people find appealing the idea that we might extend human life—or some-
thing more essential about humanity than life—synthetically via AI and/or
robotics. Unfortunately, both of these ideas are deeply incoherent, resting
on ignorance about the nature of intelligence.
As described in Sec 3.1 earlier, both of these appeals assume that intel-
ligent means in part humanlike. While there is no question that the word
has been used that way culturally, by the definitions presented in Sec 2 it is
clearly completely false. To address the second concern first, the values, mo-
tivations, even the aesthetics of an enculturated ape cannot be meaningfully
shared with a device that shares nothing of our embodied physical (‘phe-
nomenological’) experience (Bryson, 2008; Claxton, 2015; Dennett, 2017).
Nothing we build from metal and silicon will ever share our phenomenology
as much as a rat or cow, and few see cows or rats as viable vessels of our
posterity.
Further, the idea that substantiating a human mind in digital technology—
even were that possible—would make it immortal or even increase its lifespan
is ludicrous. Digital formats have a mean lifetime of no more than five years
(Lawrence et al., 2000; Marshall et al., 2006). The fallacy here is again to
mistake computation for a form of mathematics. While mathematics really
is pure, eternal, and certain, that is because it is also not real—it is not
manifest in the physical world and cannot take actions. Computation in
contrast is real. As described earlier, computation takes time, space, and
energy (Sipser, 2005). Space is needed for storing state (memory), and there
is no permanent way to achieve such storage (Krauss and Starkman, 2000).
To return to the seemingly more practical idea of taxing AI entities, this
again overlooks their lack of humanity. In particular, AI is not countable as
humans are countable. This criticism holds also for Bill Gates’ support of
taxing robots, even though he did not support legal personality (author pool,
2017). There is no equivalent of “horsepower” to measure the number of hu-
mans replaced by an algorithm. As just mentioned, in the face of accelerating
innovation we can no longer keep track of the value even of transactions in-
cluding human participants. When a new technology is brought in, we might
briefly see how many humans are made redundant, but even this seems to
reflect more the current economy than the actual value of labour replaced
(Autor, 2015; Ford, 2015). When times are good, a company will retain and
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retrain experienced employees; when times are bad corporations will take
the excuse to reduce headcount. Even if the initial shift in employment were
indicative of initial “personpower” replaced, technologies quickly change the
economies into which they are inserted, and the values of human labour too
rapidly change.
It is essential to remember that artefacts are by definition designed.
Within the limits of the laws of physics and computation, we have com-
plete authorship over AI and robotics. This means that developers will be
able to evade tax codes in ways inconceivable to legislators used to value
based on human labour. The process of decomposing a corporation into au-
tomated ‘e-persons’ would enormously magnify the present problems of the
over-extension of legal personhood such as the shell corporations used for
money laundering. The already restricted sense in which it is sensible to
consider corporations to be legal persons would be fully dissolved if there are
no humans employed by the synthetic entity (Solaiman, 2016; Bryson et al.,
2017).
4. The Next Ten Years: Remediations and Futures
To stress again as at the beginning of Sec 3, AI has been and is an
incredible force of both economic growth and individual empowerment. We
are with it able to know, learn, discover, and do things that would have been
inconceivable even 50 years ago. We can walk into a strange city not knowing
the language yet find our way and communicate. We can take advantage of
education provided by the world’s best universities in our own homes, even
if we are leading a low-wage existence in a developing economy (Breslow
et al., 2013). Even in the developing world, we can use the village smart
phone to check the fair prices of various crops, and other useful information
like weather predictions, so even subsistence farmers are being drawn out of
extreme poverty by ICT. The incredible pace of completion of the Human
Genome Project is just one example of how humanity as a whole can benefit
from this technology (Adams et al., 1991; Schena et al., 1996).
Nevertheless, the concerns highlighted above need to be addressed. I
will here make suggestions about each, beginning with the most recently
presented. I will be brief here, since as usual knowledge of solutions only
follows from identification of problems, and the identifications above are not
yet agreed but only proposed. In addition, some means for redressing these
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issues have already been suggested, but I go into further and different detail
here.
4.1. Employment and Social Stability
I have already in Sec 3.4 dismissed the idea that making AI legal persons
would address the problems of employment disruption or wealth inequality
we are currently experiencing. In fact e-personhood would almost certainly
increase inequality by shielding companies and wealthy individuals from lia-
bility, at the cost of the ordinary person. We have good evidence now that
wealthy individual donors can lead politicians to eccentric, extremist position
taking (Barber, 2016) which can lead to disastrous results when coupled with
increasing pressure for political polarisation and identity politics. It is also
important to realise that not every extremely wealthy individual necessarily
reveals the level of their wealth publicly.
In democracies, another correlate of periods of high inequality and high
polarisation is very close elections, even where candidates might otherwise
not seem evenly matched. This of course opens the door to (or at leat reduces
the cost of) manipulation of elections, including by external powers. Person
(2018) suggests weak countries may be practicing ‘subtractive balancing’
against stronger ones, by disrupting elections and through them governance
abilities and therefore autonomy, in an effort to reduce power differentials in
the favour of the weaker nation. If individuals or coalitions of individuals are
sufficiently wealthy to reduce the efficacy of governments, then states also
lose their autonomy, including the stability of their borders.
War, anarchy, and their associated instability is not a situation anyone
should really want be in, though those who presently profit from illegal ac-
tivity might think otherwise. Everyone benefits from sufficient stability to
plan businesses and families. The advent of transnational corporations has
been accompanied by a substantial increase in the number and power of other
transnational organisations. These may be welcome if they help coordinate
cooperation on transnational interests, but it is important to realise that
geography will always be a substantial determiner of many matters of gov-
ernment. How well your neighbour’s house is protected from fire, whether
their children are vaccinated or well educated, will always affect your quality
of life. Fresh water, sewage, clean air, protection from natural disasters, pro-
tection from invasion, individual security, access to transport options—local
and national governments will continue to play an extremely important role
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in the indefinite future even if in some functions are oﬄoaded to corpora-
tions or transnational governments. As such, they need to be adequately
resourced.
I recommended in Sec. 3.4 that one possible solution to the impact on
ICT on inequality is to shift priority from documenting and taxing income
to documenting and taxing wealth. The biggest problem with this sugges-
tion may be that it requires redistribution to occur internationally, not just
internationally, because the richest corporations per Internet9 are in only
one country, though certainly for those outside China—and increasingly for
those inside—their wealth derives from global activity. Handling this sit-
uation will require significant policy innovations. Fortunately, it is in the
interest of nearly all stakeholders, including leading corporations, to avoid
war and other destructive social and economic instability. The World Wars
and financial crises of the Twentieth Century showed that this was especially
true the extremely aﬄuent, who at least economically have the most to lose
(Milanovic, 2016; Scheidel, 2017), though of course do not often lose their
lives.
I particularly admire the flexible solutions to economic hardship that
Germany displayed during the recent recession, where it was possible for
corporations to partially lay off employees, who then received partial welfare
and free time (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011, p. 80). This allowed individuals to
retrain while maintaining for a prolonged period a standard of living close to
their individual norms; it also allowed companies to retain valued employees
while they pivoted business direction or just searched for liquidity. This kind
of flexibility should be encouraged, with both governments and individuals
retaining economic capacity to support themselves through periods of crisis.
In fact, sufficient flexibility may prevent periods of high change from being
periods of crisis.
If we can reduce inequality, I believe the problems of employment will
also reduce, despite any increase in the pace of change. We are a fabulously
wealthy society, and can afford to support individuals at least partially as
they retrain. We are also fantastically innovative. If money is circulating in
communities, then individuals will find ways to employ each other, and to
9The world is effectively split into two Internets, one inside and one outside the Great
Firewall (Ensafi et al., 2015). Both sides similarly contain a small number of extremely
successful companies operating in the digital economy (Yiu, 2016; Dolata, 2017).
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perform services for each other (Hunter et al., 2001; Autor, 2015). Again, this
may already be happening, and could account for the decreased rate of change
some authors claim to detect in society (e.g. Cowen, 2011). A great number
of individuals may continue finding avenues of self and (where successful)
other employment in producing services within their own communities, from
the social such as teaching, policing, journalism, and family servies, to the
aesthetic such as personal, home, and garden decoration, and the provision
of food, music, sports, and other communal acts.
The decision about whether such people are able to live good enough
lives that they can benefit from the advantages of their society is a matter of
economic policy. We would want any family to be able for example to afford
a week’s holiday in the nearest large city, or to have their children experience
social mobility, for example getting into the top universities in their chosen
area purely based on merit. Of course we expect in this century universal
and free access to healthcare, and primary and secondary education. Peo-
ple should be able to live with their families but also not need to commute
for enormous portions of their day, this requires both distributed employ-
ment opportunities and excellent, scalable (and therefore probably public)
transportation infrastructure.
The level of investment in such infrastructure depends in part on the in-
vestment both public and private in taxation, and also on how such wealth is
spent. Historically we have in some periods spent a great deal on the destruc-
tion of others’ infrastructure and repair of ones own due to warfare. Now
even if we avoid open ballistic warfare, we must face the necessity of aban-
doning old infrastructure that is no longer viable due to climate change, and
investing in other locations. Of course, this offers a substantial opportunity
for redistribution, particularly into some currently economically depressed
cities, as was shown by Roosevelt’s New Deal, which substantially reduced
inequality in the USA well before the second world war (McCarty et al., 2016;
Wright, 1974).
I am with those who do not believe the universal basic income is a great
mechanism of redistribution, for several reasons. First, many hope to fund
it by cutting public services, but these may well be increasingly needed as
increasing numbers of people cannot deal with the technical and economic
complexities of a world of accelerating change. Second, I have seen far too
many standing safely in the middle of road telling television cameras that
“the government has never done anything for me”, ignorant of massive invest-
ment in their education, security, and infrastructure. I think a basic income
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would easily become as invisible and taken for granted as trash collection
and emergency services apparently are.
But most importantly, I would prefer redistribution to reenforce the im-
portance of local civic communities, that is to circulate through employment,
whether direct or as freelancers and customers. AI and ICT make it easy to
bond with people from all over the world, or indeed with entertaining fan-
tasies employing AI technology that are not actually human. But our neigh-
bours’ well being has enormous impacts on our own and are in many senses
shared, through the quality of water, air, education, fire and other emergency
services, and of course personal security. The best neighbourhoods are con-
nected through knowledge and personal concern, that is localised friendships.
One effective mechanism of increasing redistribution is just the increase
of minimum wages (Lee, 1999; Schmitt, 2013). Even if this is only done for
government employees, it has knock-on effects for the rest of employers as
they compete for the best people, and of course also also gives the advantage
of having better motivation for good workers to contribute to society through
civil service. Although this mechanism has been attacked for a wide variety
of reasons (e.g. Meyer, 2016), the evidence seems fairly good for positive
impacts overall.
4.2. Privacy, Liberty, and Innovation
Stepping back to the coupled problems of privacy and individual auton-
omy, we hit an area for which predictions are more difficult or at least more
diverse. It is clear that the era of privacy through obscurity is over, as we
now have more information and more means to filter and understand infor-
mation than ever before, and this is unlikely to be changed by anything short
of a global disaster eliminating our digital capacity. Nevertheless, we have
long been in the situation of inhabiting spaces where our governments and
neighbours could in theory take our private property from us, but seldom
do except by contracted agreement such as taxation (Christians, 2009). Can
we arrive at a similar level of control over our personal data? Can we have
effective privacy and autonomy in the information era? If not, what would
be the consequences?
First it should be said that any approach to defending personal data and
protecting citizens from being predicted, manipulated, or outright controlled
via their personal data requires strong encryption and cybersecurity—without
back doors. Every back door in cybersecurity has been exploited by bad
actors (Abelson et al., 2015). Weak cybersecurity should be viewed as a
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significant risk to the AI and digital economy, particularly the Internet of
Things (IoT). If intelligent or even just connected devices cannot be trusted,
they will and should not be welcome in homes or workplaces (Singh et al.,
2016; Weber, 2010).
Many thinkers on the topic of technologically mediated privacy have sug-
gested that data about a person should be seen not as an asset of the person
but as part of that person — an extension of an individual’s identity. As
such, personal data cannot be owned by anyone but the person to whom
it refers; any other use is by lease or contract which cannot be extended
or sold onwards without consent (Crabtree and Mortier, 2015; Gates and
Matthews, 2014). This would make personal data more like your person; if
it and therefore you are violated, you should have recourse to the law. There
are a variety of legal and technological innovations being developed in order
to pursue this model, however given both the ease of access to data and the
difficulty of proving such access, data may be far more difficult to defend
than physical personal property (Rosner, 2014; Jentzsch, 2014). Fortunately,
at least some governments have made it part of their job to defend the data
interests of their citizens (e.g. the GDPR Albrecht, 2016; Danezis et al.,
2014). This is for excellent reasons, since as described above there are both
political and economic consequences of foreign extraction of data wealth and
manipulation of individual political preferences and other behaviour based
on those individual’s social media profiles.
The best situated entities to defend our privacy are governments, pre-
sumably through class-action lawsuits of at least the most egregious exam-
ples of violation of personal data. Note that such courses of action may
require major innovations of international law or treaties, since some of the
most prominent allegations of manipulation involve electoral outcomes for
entire countries. For example, the UK’s Brexit vote has in the first two
years since the referendum (and before any actual exit of the EU) cost the
country £23bn in lost tax revenue, or £44mn a week (Morales, 2018). As
mentioned earlier the Brexit vote is alleged to have been influenced by known
AI algorithms, which have been shown to have been funded through foreign
investment (ICO, 2018). Ironically, achieving compensation for such damage
would almost certainly require international collaboration.
Unfortunately, governments do not always have their citizens’ interests at
heart, or at least, not always all of their citizens’ interests. Indeed, globally
in the Twentieth Century, one was far more likely to be killed by one’s
own government than by any foreign actor (Valentino, 2004). More recently,
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China has been using the surveillance system that was supposed to keep its
citizens safe to destroy the lives and families of over a million of its citizens by
placing them in reeducation camps for the crime of even casually expressing
their Muslim identity (Human Rights Watch, 2018; Editor, 2018). More
generally, if governments fear whistle blowing, dissent, or even just shirk
the responsibility for guaranteeing dignity and flourishing for all those in
their territory, then they can and often will suppress and even kill those
individuals. It is extremely dangerous when a government views governing a
group of people within its borders as more cost or trouble than their collective
potential value for labour, security, and innovation is worth. Aggravating this
grave threat, we have both the promise and the hype of intelligent automation
as a new, fully ownable and controllable source of both labour and innovation.
The inflated discourse around AI increases the risk that a government will
(mis)assesses the value of human lives to be lower than the perceived costs
of maintaining those lives.
We cannot know the sure outcome of the current trajectories, but where
any sort of suppression is to be exercised, we can readily expect that AI
and ICT will be the means for monitoring and predicting potential trouble
makers. China is alleged to be using face-recognition capacities not only to
identify individuals, but to identify their moods and attentional states both
in reeducation camps and in ordinary schools. Students and perhaps teach-
ers can be penalised if students do not pay attention, and prisoners can be
punished if they do not appear happy to comply with their (re)education.
ICT systems able to detect and inform teachers to adjust lectures and ma-
terial towards students’ attention and comprehension are also being pitched
for classrooms in the West, and are core to personalised AI instruction out-
side of conventional classrooms. Presumably similar systems are also being
developed and probably applied for other sorts of work (e.g. Levy, 2015).
If we allow such trends to carry on, we can expect societies that are safer—
or at least more peaceful on the streets—more homogenous, less innovative,
and less diverse. More people have the means and economic wherewithal
to move between countries now than ever before, so we might hope that
countries that truly produce the best quality of life including governance and
individual protection will be attractors to those who care about personal
liberty. We may also hope that with the combined power of those immigrants
and their extant citizens’ labour and innovation, these countries may come
to be able to protect not only themselves but others. We’ve already seen
the EU do such protection by setting standards of AI ethics such as the
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GDPR, and of course the United Nations is working with instruments such
as the Paris Agreement to protect us all from from climate change. In such
well-governed and flourishing societies, we would expect to see perhaps an
increase rather than a decrease in present levels of liberty, as we come to
recognise the problems arising from the surveillance we already practice, e.g.
in micromanaging our children’s personal time (Lee et al., 2010; Bryson,
2015).
Unfortunately for this optimistic vision of pools of wellbeing spreading
from well-governed countries, in practice technology is increasingly being
used or being threatened to be used for blocking any cross-border migration
except by the most elite (Miller, 2017). Besides genocide and mass killings,
another historic trend often observed in wars and political revolutions (e.g.
Nazi occupied Poland, cold war Czechoslovakia, The Iranian Revolution,
Stalin’s USSR, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, China’s Cultural Revo-
lution, present-day Saudi Arabia) is the displacement or even execution of not
only dissidents but all and any intelligentsia. The effort to maintain control
is often seen as requiring the elimination of any potential innovative leader-
ship, even though precisely such leadership may be necessary to keep people
healthy and therefore civil society stable (King and Zeng, 2001), not to men-
tion maintaining the technological progress necessary to stay abreast in any
arms race (Yan, 2006). Such movements tend to fail only after protracted
suffering, and often only after having persisted long enough to make clear the
damage of their policies to the country’s international competitiveness. AI
makes the identification and isolation of any such targeted group—or even
individuals with target attitudes—spectacularly easy. Only if we are able
to also innovate protections against corrupt, selfish, or otherwise dangerous
governance can we protect ourselves from losing the diversity and liberty of
our societies, and therefore the security of us all.
Again, the capacity for AI to be used for good governance leading to
fairer and stronger societies is very real and widely being developed. For
example, AI is used to reduce financial crime, fraud, and money laundering,
protecting individuals, societies, and governments from undue and illegal in-
fluence (Ngai et al., 2011). This is sensible and a part of ordinary contractual
understandings of the duties of financial service providers and indeed gov-
ernments. It may also be ethical for citizens to be ‘nudged’ by their devices
or other agencies into behaviours they have consciously chosen and explicitly
expressed a desire for, such as exercise or sleep regimes. But it is impor-
tant to recognise the massively increased threats of both explicit duress and
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implicit misleading that accompanies the massive increase of knowledge and
therefore power that derive from AI. AI therefore increases the urgency of in-
vestment in research and development in the humanities and social sciences,
particularly the political sciences and sociology. I therefore now turn to the
problem of regulating AI.
4.3. Individual, Corporate, and Regulatory Responsibility for AI
To begin the discussion of responsibility in an age of AI, I want to return
briefly to emphasise again the role of design and architectures on AI. Again
perhaps because of the misidentification of intelligent with human, I have
sometimes heard even domain experts from influential organisations claim
that one or another trait of AI is inevitable. There is no aspect of AI more
inevitable than slavery or the hereditary rights of monarchy. Of course, both
of these still persist in some places, but despite their economic benefits to
those formerly in power, they have been largely eradicated. Similarly, we
can regulate at least legal commercial products to mandate safe or at least
transparent architectures (Boden et al., 2011). We can require—as again
the European Commission recently has—that decisions taken by machines
be traceable and explainable (Goodman and Flaxman, 2016).
Maintaining human accountability for AI systems does not have to mean
that we must (or can) account for the value of every weight in a machine-
learned neural network, or the impact of every individual instance of data
used in training. Not only is this impractical, it is not the standard or
means by which we currently hold organisations accountable. A company
is not responsible for the synaptic organisation of its accounts’ brains, it is
responsible for the state of its accounts. Introducing AI into a corporate
or governance process actually changes little with respect to responsibility.
We still need to be able to characterise our systems well enough to recognise
whether they are behaving as intended (Liu et al., 2017). This is doable, and
it should be encouraged (Bryson and Theodorou, 2019).
Encouraging responsibility entails ensuring we continue maintaining ac-
countability (Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven, 2018). One simple way
to do this is to educate governments and prosecutors that software systems
have much the same liability issues as any other manufactured artefact—if
they are misused, it is the fault of the owner; if they cause harm when being
appropriately used, they are at fault and the manufacturer is likely liable
unless they can prove due diligence and exceptional circumstance. The mere
fact that part of the system is autonomous does not alter this fact, just as
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a bank can be held accountable for errors generated by its accountants or
customers where they bank’s systems should have caught or constrained such
errors. There are certainly challenges here, particularly because so many ap-
plications of AI technology are in transnational contexts, but organisations
such as the EU, UN, and OECD are looking to be able to coordinate the
efforts of nations to protect their citizens.
Of course AI systems are not exactly like more deterministic systems, but
exaggerating the consequences of those differences creates problems. Bad
ideas can be hidden by the “smoke and mirrors” of the confusion generated
by AI around identity and moral agency (Bryson, 2018). One concerning
trend in AI governance that concerning is the trend for value alignment as
a solution to difficult questions of science generally, and AI ethics in par-
ticular. The idea is that we should ensure that society leads and approves
of where science or technology go (Soares and Fallenstein, 2014). This may
sound very safe and democratic, but it is perhaps better seen as populist.
Speaking first to science: science is a principle mechanism enabling society
to accurately perceive its context. In contrast, governance is how a soci-
ety chooses between potential actions. Popular sentiment cannot determine
what is true about nature; it can only determine what policies are easiest to
deploy. To limit a society’s capacity to perceive to only the things it wants
to know would be to blind that society (Caliskan et al., 2017, see the final
discussion). Similarly, the outcomes of policy are highly influenced by pub-
lic sentiment, but certainly not determined by it. Asking the public what
it wants from AI is like asking them which science fiction film they would
most like to see realised—there is no guarantee they will choose one that is
feasible, let alone truly desirable in protracted detail. While the public must
through government determine its economic and political priorities, actual
progress is almost never achieved by referendum. Rather, governance almost
always comes down to informed negotiations between a limited number of
expert negotiators, supported by a larger but still limited number of domain
experts.
Even given the vast resources available through exploiting computation
and AI, it is likely that human negotiators will always be the best determin-
ers of policy. This is partly because we as citizens can identify with human
representatives, thus establishing trust and investment in the negotiated out-
comes. But more importantly, human representatives can be held to account
and persuaded in ways that AI never can be. We cannot intentionally de-
sign systems to be as centred on social outcomes as human or indeed any
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social animal’s intelligence has evolved to be. We cannot do this by design,
because design by its nature is a decomposable process, whereas evolution
has repeatedly discovered that concern for social standing must be an in-
extricable part of an individual’s intelligence for a species reliant on social
strategies for its survival. Thus are entire system of just relies on dissuasion
to do with isolation, loss of power or social standing. We cannot apply such
standards of justice to machines we design, and we cannot trace accountabil-
ity through machines we do not carefully design (Bryson et al., 2017; Bryson
and Theodorou, 2019).
Finally, some have expressed concern that it is impossible to maintain
regulation in the face of AI because of the rapid rate of change AI entails.
It is true that individual humans have limits in their capacities, including
on how quickly we can respond. Similarly, legislation can only be written
at a particular pace. Latencies are in fact deliberately built into the legisla-
tive process to ensure the pace of change is not too high for business and
personal planning (Holmes, 1988; Cowen, 1992; Ginsburg, 2005; Roithmayr
et al., 2015). Therefore legislation alone cannot be expected to keep up with
the accelerating pace of change brought on by AI and ICT. I have previously
suggested that one mechanism for forging sensible policy is to have domain
experts working through professional organisations describe systems of stan-
dards (Bryson and Winfield, 2017). The role of government then is reduced
to monitoring those efforts and lending enforcement to their outcomes. The
arguments I have made above (and in Bryson and Theodorou, 2019) might
be seen as a generalisation of this principle. Here we are saying that we do
not need to change legislation at all, simply hold organisations that build or
exploit AI to account for the consequences for their systems’ actions by the
ordinary and established means of tracing accountability. It is then these
organisations who will need to do the innovation on accountability in lock
step with their other innovation, so that they can demonstrate that they
have always followed due diligence with their systems.
5. Conclusion
Artificial intelligence is already changing society at a faster pace than we
realise, but at the same time it is not as novel or unique in human experience
as we are often lead to imagine. Other artifactual entities, such as language
and writing, corporations and governments, telecommunication and oil, have
previously extended our capacities, altered our economies, and disrupted our
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social order—generally though not universally for the better. The evidence
that we are on average better off for our progress is ironically perhaps the
greatest threat we currently need to master: sustainable living and reversing
the collapse of biodiversity.
Nevertheless AI—and ICT more generally—may well require radical in-
novations in the way we govern, and particularly in the way we raise revenue
for redistribution. We are faced with transnational wealth transfers through
business innovations that have outstripped our capacity to measure or even
identify the level of income generated. Further, this new currency of unknow-
able value is often personal data, and personal data gives those who hold it
the immense power of prediction over the individuals it references.
But beyond the economic and governance challenges, we need to remem-
ber that AI first and foremost extends and enhances what it means to be hu-
man, and in particular our problem-solving capacities. Given ongoing global
challenges such as security and sustainability, such enhancements promise
to continue to be of significant benefit, assuming we can establish good
mechanisms for their regulation. Through a sensible portfolio of regulatory
policies and agencies, we should continue to expand—and also to limit, as
appropriate—the scope of potential AI application.
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